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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"coupled with an interest" should. The interest seems to be
equally efficacious in both cases regardless of whether it is en-
grafted in the thing itself. To require that a power coupled with
an interest or estate in the thing to be disposed of must be held
by the agent to render the agency irrevocable by the principal is
an innovation which even the Hunt case does not support. Since
no distinction between a power coupled with an interest and one
given as security is recognized by the French authorities, the
early Louisiana cases, or the modern trend of American legal
thought, it is particularly unfortunate that the court saw fit to
give lip service to it in the principal case.
J.C.W.
BOTTLER'S LIABILITY TO ULTIMATE CONSUMERS FOR INJURY
CAUSED BY DEFECTIVE PRODUCTs-Plaintiff sustained certain in-
juries as a result of the explosion of a bottle of carbonated bev-
erage. Plaintiff, relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,' re-
ceived a judgment in the trial court, which judgment was set
aside by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, the court indicating
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to this
type of case. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, reversed
the decision of the circuit court and reinstated the judgment of
the district court. Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Works, 199 La. 599, 6
So. (2d) 677 (1941).
The decisions of American state courts applying to cases in-
volving liability of manufacturers to ultimate consumers where
bottled beverages have exploded or contained deleterious sub-
stances are marked by a noticeable lack of uniformity.
Courts have approached the problem upon two distinct the-
ories of liability,2 i.e., the tort theory of negligence and the con-
tract theory of implied warranty. The latter has been increasingly
applied in recent years.
A majority of the common law courts, in applying the negli-
gence theory, have held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
1. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine see the article by Malone,
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana
Cases (1941) 4 LOUiSIANA LAw REvimw 70.
2. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 688-689.
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applicable to this type of case.3 Some have held, however, that
the doctrine does not apply.4
The theory of implied warranty, though presently recognized
by a distinct minority of states, has met with considerable favor
during recent years. Courts applying the warranty theory allow
recovery to the ultimate consumer for breach of an implied war-
ranty of fitness for intended use5 and disregard the technical lack
of privity. It is argued in support of this doctrine that, since the
consumer is without opportunity to inspect for himself when he
buys a bottled beverage, he has a right to rely upon the implied
assurance of the manufacturer that the contents are fit for human
consumption. It is maintained that, because of such known reli-
ance, it is only just and reasonable to hold the manufacturer
strictly liable for any injury resulting from the consumption of
his product.
The Ortego case is the first bottling case to reach the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court; and it was held, without apparent contro-
versy, that negligence was the proper theory under which to
bring the action. This case is in accord with those decisions of
the Louisiana circuit courts which have held, without exception,
that negligence is the proper ground for recovery., By its deci-
3. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Henderson v. Munn, 99 F. (2d) 190 (1938);
Albany Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shiver, 63 Ga. App. 755, 12 S.E. (2d) 114
(1940); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926);
Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W. (2d) 701 (1930); Blount v.
Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 184 Miss. 69, 185 So. 241 (1939); Coca-Cola
Bottling Works, Inc. of Columbus v. Pelty, 200 So. 128 (Miss. 1941); Rozu-
mailkski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 Atl. 700
(1929); Parr v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Charleston, 121 W. Va. 314, 3 S.E.
(2d) 499 (1939); Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 73 S.E. 1087 (Geo.
1912).
4. Birmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64
(1921); Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 175, 145 S.E. 14
(1928); Evans v. Charlotte Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 216 N.C. 716, 6 S.E. (2d)
510 (1940); Gantt v. Columbia Cola-Cola Bottling Co., 193 S.C. 51, 7 S.E. (2d)
641 (1940); Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545, 179 S.W. 155,
L.R.A. 1916B, 877, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 572 (1915).
5. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of South East Arkansas v. Spurlin, 137 Ark.
541, 132 S.W. (2d) 828 (1939); Coleman v. Dublin Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 47
Ga. App. 369, 170 S.E. 549 (1933); Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Greenwood v.
Simpson, 158 Miss. 390, 130 So. 479 (1930); Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444 (1923); Beyer v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
of St. Louis, 75 S.W. (2d) 642 (Mo. App. 1934); Madouros v. Kansas City
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W. (2d) 445 (1936); Nock v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburgh, 102 Pa. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931);
Wilkes v. Memphis Grocery Co., 23 Tenn. App. 550, 134 S.W. (2d) 929 (1939);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ft. Worth v. Smith, 97 S.W. (2d) 761 (Tex. 1936).
6. Dean v. Alexandria Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 148 So. 448 (La. App. 1933);
Von Herr v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 148 So. 75 (La. App. 1933);
King v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 151 So. 252 (La, App. 1933); Russo
v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 161 So. 909 (La. App. 1935); Watts v.
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sion holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable
to this type of case the Louisiana Supreme Court resolved an ex-
isting disagreement between circuit court decisions. The first cir-
cuit had always recognized the doctrine as applicable to the bot-
tling cases,7 but the second circuit had manifested a contrary
opinion.'
Louisiana courts have always held bottlers to a very high
degree of care. To establish his case the plaintiff must allege and
prove three things:9 (1) that the beverage contained a harmful
substance (or exploded), (2) that plaintiff partook of the con-
tents of the bottle (or was hit by flying glass), and (3) that in-
jury resulted. After these facts have been established the defend-
ant bears the burden of rebutting the prima facie case of negli-
gence thus established against him in order to escape liability.10
The defenses usually relied upon by the defendant bottling
companies consist of endeavoring to establish due care by show-
ing (1) that the bottling equipment is of first class quality,"' and
(2) that the deleterious substance complained of entered the bot-
tle, if at all, after the product left the manufacturer.12 The first
defense is generally of no avail to the defendant unless the case
made out by the plaintiff is extremely weak. The second defense
will operate to excuse the defendant, but in nearly all cases this
burden of proof has been found too difficult to be sustained.
The Louisiana courts have, as yet, avoided the application of
the implied warranty doctrine to the bottling cases. The reluc-
tance of our courts to recognize and apply the warranty theory in
these cases is illustrated by the case of Russo v. Louisiana Coca-
Cola Bottling Company,8 where it was implied that such a doc-
Ouachita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 161 So. 151 (La. App. 1936); Hill v. Louisiana
Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 170 So. 45 (La. App. 1936); Freeman v. Louis-
iana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 179 So. 621 (La. App. 1938); Auzenne v. Gulf
Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938); Kohlman v. Jefferson Bottling
Co., 192 So, 113 (La. App. 1939); Dye v. American Beverage Co., Inc., 194 So.
438 (La. App. 1940); Hollis v. Ouachita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 So. 376
(La. App. 1940); Gunter v. Alexandria Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 197 So. 159 (La.
App. 1940); Jenkins v. Bogalusa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1 So. (2d) 426 (La.
App. 1941); Lanza v. DeRidder Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 So. (2d) 217 (La.
App. 1941).
7. Auzenne v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938); Lanza
v. DeRidder Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 So. (2d) 217 (La. App. 1941).
8. Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Co., Inc., 6 So. (2d) 674 (La. App. 1941).
9. Dye v. American Beverage Co., Inc., 194 So. 438 (La. App. 1940).
10. Auzenne v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938).
11. Hill v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 So. 45 (La. App. 1936);
Watts v. Ouachita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 166 So. 151 (La. App. 1936).
12. King v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 151 So. 252 (La. App. 1933);
Dean v. Alexandria Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 148 So. 448 (La. App. 1933).
13. 161 So. 909 (La. App. 1935).
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trine would place too great a burden on bottling companies who
cannot afford to insure absolutely each consumer's health for the
premium of five cents. Nevertheless, a survey of the Louisiana
decisions readily indicates that bottlers are held to such a high
degree of care under an application of the res ipsa loquitur theory
that the practical result is not dissimilar to that which would be
obtained if the implied warranty doctrine were applied.1"
In the recent case of Dye v. American Beverage Company
the Orleans Circuit Court approved the effectual strict liability
that had been applied in a prior decision.16 Judge McCaleb de-
clared:
"We have many times said that, where the plaintiff shows
by a preponderance of evidence that the beverage contained
a foreign substance, that he consumed it and suffered injuries
as a result, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
excuse itself from liability by proving to the satisfaction of
the court that the foreign matter did not enter the beverage
during the bottling or manufacturing process."'7 (Italics sup-
plied.)
In light of the foregoing language, it would appear that prov-
ing due care or even high care in the bottling process will avail
the defendant nothing. He would virtually have to prove that the
deleterious substance could not have entered his product during
the bottling process. It seems necessary, therefore, to conclude
that, as a practical matter, the presence of foreign substance in
the beverage raises an almost irrebutable presumption of negli-
gence.
It is difficult to draw any real line of distinction between the
result that is obtained by applying this type of negligence doc-
trine and that result which would be obtained by applying the
implied warranty doctrine. For this reason it is to be doubted,
regardless of the social desirability of holding the bottling com-
pany strictly liable to the ultimate consumer, whether the Lou-
14. Hill v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 So. 45, 46 (La. App.
1936): "the burden of proof shifts to defendant company to excuse itself from
liability by proving to the satisfaction of the court that the foreign substance
or glass did not enter its product during the manufacturing or bottling
process." See King v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 151 So. 252 (La. App.
1933); Kelley v. Ouachita Dairy Dealers Coop., 175 So. 499 (La. App. 1937);
Dye v. American Beverage Co., 194 So. 438 (La. App. 1940); Hollis v. Ouachita
Coca-Cola Co., 196 So. 376 (La. App. 1940); Jenkins v. Bogalusa Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 1 So. (2d) 426 (La. App. 1941).
15. 194 So. 438 (La. App. 1940).
16. Hill v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 So. 45 (La. App. 1936).
17. 194 So. 438, 440 (La. App. 1940).
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isiana decisions will ever be based upon the implied warranty
theory. By applying the unique theory which our courts have de-
volved from the negligence concept, bottlers are held to a liability
just as strict as it would be under the implied warranty theory.
The negligence approach of the Louisiana decisions enables
the courts to avoid the troublesome aspects of privity inherent in
the implied warranty theory and yet achieves the same practical
results. By not having committed themselves to the warranty
theory the Louisiana courts provide a flexibility of decision which
will permit a more equitable disposition of extreme cases.
H. C. L.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - APPOINTMENT BY GOVERNOR TO FILL
TEMPORARY VACANCIEs-On December 20, 1941, George E. Wil-
liams, criminal sheriff for the Parish of Orleans, died in office.
His unexpired term was only three months and fourteen days.
On the same day the judges of the criminal district court held a
session en banc and under Section 93 of Article VII of the Louis-
iana Constitution' appointed John J. Williams to serve until the
vacancy should be filled by election or by appointment by the
Governor "as provided by law.' ' 2 Later in the same day, the Gov-
ernor appointed Campbell Palfrey for the unexpired term. On
December 22, 1941, Palfrey demanded the office of Williams, but
the latter refused. On the same afternoon the judges held another
session and decided that, since the incumbent had contested the
claim of Palfrey, and since the outcome of the contest would de-
pend upon the validity of the appointment of Palfrey by the Gov-
ernor, the court would continue to recognize Williams as tempo-
rary sheriff until and unless he should be ousted by a judgment of
a civil court having jurisdiction over contests for title to public
office. Palfrey filed a petition in the supreme court for supervi-
sory writs to compel the judges of the criminal district court for
the Parish of Orleans to recognize him as criminal sheriff for the
1. "... vacancies in the office of the criminal sheriff (for the Parish of
Orleans], clerk of the Criminal District Court, clerk and constable of the city
courts, shall be filled temporarily by the judges of the courts to which they
are attached, and all of said appointees shall serve until such vacancies are
filled by election or appointment, as provided by law."
2. "Vacancies occasioned by death, resignation or otherwise, in the of-
fice of ... sheriff ... where less than one year, shall be filled by appointment
by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. La. Const.
of 1921, Art. VII, § 69.
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